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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRENT POLL 
Petitioner and Appellant 
vs 
CITY OF SOUTH WEBER 
Respondent and Appellee 
i 
Case No. 20040888 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the final order of the Second District Court, Judge Kay, 
concerning the propriety of a 22 January 2004 closed City Planning Commission meeting. 
The Second District Court ruled that this closed meeting, and another closed City Council 
meeting of 28 October 2003, were not in violation of the Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Act. The appropriateness of the 28 October 2003 City Council meeting is not part of this 
appeal. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b) to review 
for correctness the District Court's ruling regarding the 22 January 2004 closed session. 
1 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(1) Whether the Second District Court erred in ruling that the sole purpose 
of the 22 January 22, 2004 closed meeting of the Appellee's Planning Commission 
was for a "strategy session". Appellant asserts that at least part of the meeting was for 
"information obtaining" relating to a pending legislative matter before the commission. 
Standard of Review: No deference is given to the District Court's decision as this Court 
reviews for correctness. 
Supporting Authority: Utah Code Ann.§ 52-4-1 et al; Common Cause of Utah vs. Utah 
Public Service Commission, 598 p,2d. 1312 (Utah 1979); Dairy Products Services vs The 
City of Wellsville, 2000 Ut. 81; 13 P. 3d 581; 405 Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah 2001). 
(2) Whether the Planning Commission for the City of South Weber had 
jurisdiction or advisory power over judicial or quasi-judicial matters, and if the 
closed meeting of 22 January 2004 was accordingly convened properly. Appellant 
contends that it did not, that the closed meeting was improperly called by those without 
authority to do so. 
Standard of Review: No deference is given to the District Court's decision as this Court 
reviews for correctness. 
Supporting Authority: Utah Code 52-4-1 et al; Title 10 Chapters 10-3-2 and 10-3-5 of 
South Weber City Ordinances; Kearns-Tribune Corp. vs Salt Lake County Commission, 
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2001 Ut 55; 28 P.3d 686; 424 Utah Adv. Rep 62 (Utah 2001); Andrews vs The Utah 
Board of Pardons, 836 P. 2d 790; 192 Utah Adv. Rep 8 (Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND ORDINANCES 
Determinative State Statutes include: Utah Code Ann.§ 52-4-1, 52-4-2 (1) (2) (a), 52-4-4, 
52-4-5 (l)(a)(iii), 52-4-6 (2), and 52-4-10. These are shown verbatim in Addendum C. 
Determinative South Weber City Ordinances include: Title 10, Chapters 10-1-6, 10-3-2, 
10-3-5, and 11-1-1A 4. These are shown verbatim in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee conducted closed meetings on 28 Oct 2003 and 22 January 2004 and the 
Appellant challenged the propriety of both through a 26 Jan 2004 Petition for Judicial 
Review in the Second District Court. Record 1-6. A series of motions and answers 
followed (record 7-60 and 65-72) from both parties. The sequence of events in the 
record seems confused as some of the Appellee's submissions were first filed in Weber 
County rather than Davis County. Therefore, the record shows responses being made 
occasionally before a submission was on file to address. Such confiision may complicate 
a review of the record, but it was unintentional and has no material bearing on the case. 
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The District Court reviewed copies of the closed meetings in camera and ruled, on 
17 Sep 2004, that both meetings were not in violation of the Utah Open and Public 
Meeting Act. Record 61-64. 
The Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Second District Court on 14 Oct 
2004 only in regard to the 22 Jan 2004 meeting. Record 70-71. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The Appellee has tried for almost a decade to acquire the property of the 
appellant's family located approximately at 1375 East and Lester Street in the City of 
South Weber. Record p. 9. Efforts were initially to facilitate trades between the City and 
a developer involving an adjacent property which the Mayor characterized 10 Jul 2001 as 
"more than a fair exchange" in favor of the City. Record p. 10, exhibit 3 - p.22. As part 
of those negotiations, the Appellee funded an appraisal which claimed access to this 
adjacent property through 1375 East. Record p. 10 exhibit 4 - p.28, p. 67. 
The offers from the developer, which the Mayor viewed as " more than a fair 
exchange" were not without "certain contingencies" as described by the developer in 
communications with the City Manager. The developer also expected, in the exchange, 
the rezone of two separate properties. Record p.23-27. As marked on the documents, 
the City "protected" them from public disclosure until they were ordered released to the 
Appellant by the State Records Committee. Record p. 10. 
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Other deals offered to the City by the developer while seeking an outlet to 1375 
East, some considered but not yet accepted, promised help to build the City's new 
recreation center, provide advice and its own attorneys to help condemn the Appellant's 
intersection, and to provide various city infrastructures for free or at reduced costs. 
Record p. 3, 8, 67 . 
The developer approached the City's Planning Commission on 8 Aug 2002 and 
offered two options for a vote to facilitate its proposal adjacent to 1375 East. Option one 
involved Mormon Church property and land reported by the developer as a City 
easement. Option two condemned the Appellant family's intersection which the 
developer reported to the Commission involved disputed ownership and control. Both 
options cost the citizens of South Weber either tax dollars or use of a City Park on long 
term lease from the Mormon Church. This is a City that at least publicly expects all 
developments to be totally self-contained and free of costs to residents. Both options as 
conveyed to the Commission were soon shown through the Davis County Recorder to be 
factually inaccurate. Armed with just these two misrepresentations by the developer, the 
Commission told the developer either option was acceptable but it favored option two. 
Record exhibit #2 p. 19, 20. The developer attended the 9 Oct 2001 City Council 
Meeting where the City "never considered condemning Mr. Poll's road," and that "at no 
time has the council considered condemning it" Record exhibit #2 p. 18 lines 217-232. 
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The Appellee changed tactics on 30 Dec 2003 in a City Council meeting when 
officials then declared that it wanted to buy the family's intersection, a 50? by 50f parcel, 
for "safety reasons" at a price of $12,500 which they claimed had "no effect", "no 
bearing" on the adjacent property which the developer was trying to subdivide. Record 
pages 2, 3, 8, 9, exhibit 1 - p. 16, 66. The family offered to help with safety but did not 
sell. 
The developer, on 5 Mar 04, offered the family $40,000 for the same property. 
Record exhibit 1, p. 15. The Developer was reminded that private retention of the 
intersection was essential to the effective control of the approximate 150 acres the family 
owns south of this location. 
The above events placed the Appellant's family in a constant stressful condition 
for almost a decade as rumors and genuine efforts to take their property were always 
pending and so documented in the Appellee's public records. This was exacerbated 
by fifteen closed meetings where the same matters were admittedly at issue. Record p.l, 
66. Since the filing of the Petition for Review, the number of closed meetings of this 
nature has grown to more than two dozen. 
On 22 January 2004, another Closed Executive Session was called to be held 
between 6:03 and 6:30 and so documented in the South Weber Planning Commission 
Amended Agenda. The original agenda was identical to the amended version except for 
the added reference to the Closed Executive Session. See Addendum D. A survey of 
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Commissioners, including the Commission Chairperson, showed that none were aware 
that a closed meeting was so called. None of them had initiated it. They had never 
participated before in such a session. Only one Commissioner had a copy of any 
lawsuit against the City which she had obtained on her own initiative The public record 
available to the Appellant does not identify who called this closed session. Once the City 
attorney was on site to participate in the announced closed session, the Commissioners 
voted, while still outside its normal chamber holding a work session, to proceed with it. 
Record p. 10, 68. 
Training was provided to most City officials by the League of Cities and Towns 
on 24 June 2004. This was recorded but not transcribed by the Appellee. The audio tape 
shows the instructor being asked, "Is it okay for us to receive advice in a closed meeting 
about how we should vote on a rezone or a subdivision?" 
"No" was the one word answer. A discussion then followed with the instructor 
emphasizing that the question wasn't whether city officials wanted a closed session, but if 
the reason for having one was well warranted and lawful. The City Manager in August 
2004 told the Planning Commission to disregard this instructor. 
After the closed session, the City's attorney left the building and the Commission 
conducted an open meeting with the Final Plat Review for the developer's proposed 
subdivision as a primary item on the Agenda. The City manager and the developer 
pushed hard with the claim that the subdivision was ready for final approval, but members 
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of the audience interrupted with claims that a pending lawsuit, questions about easements 
and rights-of-way on both 1550 and 1375 East, and an assortment of other essential 
ingredients should be addressed before a vote should be taken. Record p.4, 10, 11 
With a 5-0 vote, the Commission tabled the request for approval and placed a 
number of requirements on the developer to satisfy before returning. Among the 
requirements was for the Developer to produce documents showing easements for utilities 
down 1375 East. Exhibit 5 - p. 33 lines 274-279. 
The Petition for Judicial Review, to Challenge the Legality of the 22 Jan 2004 
Closed Executive Session, was filed on 26 Jan 2004. Record p. 1-6, 65. 
The developer came back to the Commission for another attempt to have its 
subdivision approved on 22 Apr 2004 without first satisfying all the requirements placed 
on it when its previous effort was tabled on 22 January 2004. Failure to obtain the 
easements required by the Commission was one major deficiency. The City Manager, 
who is an advisor with no voting authority, and the developer argued that City staff said 
easements were not necessary. The City Manager further inferred that the Mayor's letter 
to a city resident reflected the official City policy when a road was in dispute rather than 
the conclusions of the Commission when requesting easements on 22 January 2004. 
Record exhibit # 5 - p.33. 
The City Manager and Commission Chairperson, in the 22 Apr 2004 meeting, 
reminded the Commissioners of the information supplied to them by the City attorney in 
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the 22 January 2004 closed session. The Commission chairperson told the other 
Commissioners 'that you have to make your decision based on the information he gave 
you." Record p. 31, 32 exhibit 5 p. 33 lines 267-271. The text of this exhibit shows that 
the only decision then at issue was the proposal to approve the developer's subdivision. 
Those outside the 22 Jan 2004 closed session do not have the information from the City's 
attorney that the Commission was told it had to "make its decision based on". 
The Mayor and entire City Council have gone on record claiming that "it is 
expected" that the advice of the City Manager and City Attorney should be followed 
"more often than not." This conclusion was reinforced by the Appellee, in the record on 
page 40, within its motion. The planning Commission voted 3 to 2 on 22 Apr 2004 to 
approve the developer's subdivision. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Appellee's Planning Commission is not a judicial or quasi-judicial 
organization. Deciding or advising on strategy concerning pending or reasonably 
imminent litigation is not within the scope of its mission or its powers and duties. The 
calling or convening of the closed executive session at issue was a surprise to the 
untrained and inexperienced (with closed sessions) Commissioners. They voted at the 
last second, while outside normal chambers conducting a work session, for such a 
meeting as the Appellee's attorney arrived on site to participate. This vote was without 
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regard for the fact that the announced subject was a matter over which the Commission 
had no jurisdiction. 
The State Legislature clearly meant for the public's business to be conducted 
openly. This simple truth precludes a political subdivision of the State from threatening 
to acquire a citizen's property then meeting in secret for almost a decade, even after the 
strategic advantages of location and price have been publicly divulged, under the 
pretense that whatever it may discuss involving that citizen's property (including the 
supposed safety of citizens) can be hidden from public scrutiny under the guise of a 
pending-litigation umbrella. Accordingly, a City's attorney involved in condemnation or 
other lawsuits may also provide input to officials about what he/she believes regarding a 
pending legislative proposal, but this is "information obtaining" for the decision-makers 
and must be available for the public to weigh together with the rest of the information 
used in forming such decisions. This is especially the case when the advice of the City's 
attorney is officially expected to be taken "more often than not." 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
THE APPELLEE'S PLANNING COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION 
OVER JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL MATTERS AND THE CLOSED 
EXECUTIVE SESSION OF 22 JANUARY 2004 WAS CONVENED CONTRARY 
TO STATE STATUES 
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City Ordinance 10-3-2 shows a large Scope of Responsibility for the Planning 
Commission of the City of South Weber, but it does not include anything of a judicial or 
quasi-judicial nature. 
Ordinance 10-3-5 provides details of the Powers and Duties expected of this 
Commission, but those too reflect nothing of jurisdiction or authority over judicial or 
quasi-judicial matters. This ordinance allows the City Council to expand the 
Commission's role as needed, but there is nothing in the record to suggest an expansion 
involving judicial matters was ever envisioned. No other City official or employee is 
authorized, by City Ordinance and duties and powers described therein, to provide more 
than advice, evaluation and encouragement to the Commission. They cannot call or 
convene meetings for it. The above facts have since been reinforced 24 Jun 2004 to City 
officials by an instructor from the League of Cities and Towns, but in August 2004, the 
City Manager told the City's Planning Commissioners to disregard this instructor. 
Addendum D shows both the original and amended agendas for the 22 Jan 2004 
Planning Commission meeting. The difference between the two is that the amended 
agenda stated that a Closed Executive Session would be held between 6:03 and 6:30. This 
allowed three minutes for the Commissioners, who had never attended a closed executive 
session or been trained at that time about how to conduct one, to make a responsible 
decision. Three minutes to study, decide and vote whether they had jurisdiction over the 
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"pending-litigation" issues the City Manager and City attorney implied they were there to 
address; and whether they wished to participate in such a meeting at that exact moment. 
Surveys noted in the record indicate none of the Commissioners were aware of the 
amended agenda when it was published and only one had a copy of any litigation-related 
documents involving the City. 
As the City Attorney was already in attendance to participate only in the closed 
session, the commission voted during its work meeting to go ahead with it. 
This approval was perfunctory. The closed session was effectively called earlier 
when so expressly defined on the amended agenda and actuated when the City's attorney 
arrived to participate. Perhaps a commission with some experience or prior training may 
have been so enabled to send the City's attorney home without hearing what he had to 
offer. However, this inexperienced Commission was not then trained about closed 
sessions, but they were aware that the City's policy was to follow the advice of the City 
Manager and Attorney "more often than not." 
Since the Commission did not generate the amended agenda which announced this 
closed session or have any jurisdiction over the subject it covered, who really called this 
meeting? The record shows the developer, enabled by the City Manager, provided 
misinformation to the Planning Commission on 8 Aug 2002, and manipulated it to vote 
on two options both of which would supply taxpayer funds/resources to further its 
proposed subdivision. The record also shows this developer offering to trade land to the 
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City for "more than a fair exchange," but documents (previously withheld from public 
disclosure) prove the developer actually required completed rezones by the City of the 
developer's proposed subdivision and another parcel as terms in this 'sweetheart' 
transaction. The fact that the City tried unsuccessfully to "protect" this offer from public 
disclosure indicates that City officials were at least entertaining the barter of their 
legislative and administrative votes for "more than favorable" exchanges of value. 
This apparent willingness, to accept value from the developer in exchange for 
legislative and administrative help from the City, spawned a wave of similar offers from 
the developer. Some are shown and acknowledged by the Appellant in the record. 
Others are well documented in City documents and one can only worry over how many 
others are still "protected" from view. 
Appellant asserts that the closed meeting of 22 Jan 2004 was part of this informal 
partnership. This is premised on the fact that Planning Commissioners were told 22 Apr 
2004, regarding the City attorney's closed meeting advice, "that you have to make your 
decision based on the information he gave you." The decision at issue regarded final 
approval of the developer's subdivision. See record exhibit 5, p.33, lines 267-271. 
One of the major changes seemingly induced by the substance of the close meeting 
was release of the developer from Commission requirements to acquire easements for 
utilities planned for 1375 East. The City Manager claimed in the open session (see 
exhibit 5) that the Mayor, not the Commission, interpreted questions over what is 
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construed as a public street. However, City Ordinance 10-1-6 shows than when such 
questions arise, the interpretation of the Planning Commission "shall be construed as the 
official interpretation thereof." This Ordinance further sets the procedure where City 
officials, including the Mayor and City Manager, may disagree with the Commission's 
interpretation by elevating such disagreements eventually to District Court. 
Taken independently from the record, the City Manager's input during public 
portions of the 22 Apr 2004 meeting, besides being contrary to City Ordinances, was 
readily dismissed by a commissioner who questioned "by what authority does the Mayor 
say it is not their property (Daines and Dickamore properties)." Also, if a Court order 
was necessary to reverse the Commission's conclusion regarding ownership of 1375 East 
as reflected by its 22 Jan 2004 decisions, then "that is what we need here before we 
proceed" with the Commission's considerations of the subdivision. Exhibit 5, p.33 lines 
275-279, 282-285. While two voted to retain all the Commission's 22 Jan 2004 
requirements of the developer, the deciding three (without benefit of an explanation) 
apparently acquiesced to whatever they were told they had to make their "decision based 
on" from the closed meeting. This acquiescence violations City Ordinance 10-1-6. 
Other unresolved questions including a pending lawsuit over zoning, a 
controversial proposed easement through the City park and safety problems coming 
through 1550 East were still at issue. City Ordinance 11-1-1 4, A states that City officials 
are to avoid "premature subdivisions". 
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Ignoring those unresolved problems seems inconceivable in view of the 
Commission's regulatory responsibilities but stresses the weight that the Commissioners 
must have placed on the information they obtained in the closed meeting. 
Besides the hundreds of thousands the City stands to gain from impact fees, the 
only apparent reason for the City to allow this subdivision to move forward with so many 
unresolved problems would be to satisfy deal(s) with the developer such 
as the one the developer earlier solicited and the City tried to keep secret involving this 
same property. Record exhibit 3. p. 23-27. 
It is expected that a portion of the minutes of the closed meeting will show the City 
Manager and City Attorney providing instruction for the Commission to approve the 
Subdivision in spite of the pending lawsuits, easement issues, etc. If further deals with 
the developer are documented is doubtful as the 'sweetheart9 arrangement shown in 
exhibit 3 was not widely known even among City officials and was well hidden by the 
City for several years until the State Records Committee ordered its release. 
The advice/instruction from the City's paid advisors which should be followed 
"more often than not" (Record p. 40) must also have weighed heavily in the 
Commission's switch from a 5-0 vote, to table the developer's proposal until problems 
earlier identified were resolved, to a 3-2 vote for approval without full resolution. 
Although the City placed an inordinate value on the input of its paid advisors, they 
are still just advisors. The elected and appointed City officials are responsible, in accord 
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with State laws and City ordinances, for their own actions and failures to act when action 
is necessary. The Planning Commissioners violated State law by allowing some 
unknown individual, without authorization to do so, to amend their agenda which 
effectively convened a closed meeting to discuss or act upon a subject over which that 
public body had no jurisdiction or advisory power. Utah Code Ann.§ 52-4-2 (l)(2)(a). 
Andrews vs Utah Board of Pardons, 836 P.2d 790; 192 Utah Adv. Rep 8 (Utah 
1992) stressed the plain language of the Act as above cited. Without the authority here to 
convene the meeting, or the jurisdiction or advisory power over the matter for which it 
was to be conducted, the plain language as described in the Act was not satisfied. 
The amended agenda cited a closed session justified under Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-
5 (1) (a) (iii), but the scope of responsibility for the City's Planning Commission as 
described in City Ordinance 10-3-2 and its powers and duties as described in City 
Ordinance 10-3-5 make no reference whatsoever to providing advice or "strategy" about 
pending litigation. 
The Commissioners should have been suspicious as they never had been in such a 
meeting, and had never even been provided with copies of information or lawsuits over 
which to potentially provide advice. Their paid advisors only allowed them three mimites 
(from 6:00 to 6:03) as shown on the amended agenda to question the propriety of the 
meeting and vote to close the open session. Minutes from the work meeting show those 
three to five minutes were used to discuss other unrelated issues. They made the wrong 
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decision and were belatedly so informed by an instructor for the League of Cities and 
Towns on 24 June 2004. The City Manager told the Commission, in August 2004, to 
disregard this instructor's advice. Following the advice of the City Manager rather than 
insisting on taking the time to study this matter independently, led to the Commission's 
vote in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-5(1) (a) (iii). 
In Kearns-Tribune Corp vs Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 Ut 55; 28 P.3d 
686; 424 Utah Adv. Rep 62 (Utah 2001), the Court reasoned that a pivotal factor it had to 
decide was whether the matter before the state political entity was, in fact, litigation. 
Litigation may have been discussed in some general way in the closed 22 Jan 2004 
session, but the fact that the City's Planning Commission was told to "make decisions", 
legislative decisions not judicial ones, based on information the City's attorney provided 
during the closed session illustrates well the "matter" really before the Commission. 
The sequence of some unknown person posting a closed-meeting notice for the 
Planning Commission, before anyone within that public body had any knowledge of such 
a meeting, was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-4 and 52-4-6 (2). This unknown 
person was likely not an appointed or elected City official, but the Commissioners were 
aw^re of this infraction and did nothing to remedy it. 
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THE 22 JAN 2004 CLOSED MEETING OF THE PLANNING 
COMMISSION FOR THE CITY OF SOUTH WEBER INCLUDED 
"INFORMATION OBTAINING" TO CONSIDER IN FORMULATING A 
LEGISLATIVE DECISION 
Exhibit 5 page 33 lines 267-270 of the record shows the Planning Commission 
Chairperson reminding the Commission on 22 Apr 2004 that it "had to make decisions 
based on the information he (the City attorney) gave to you." This information was 
provided in the 22 Jan 2004 closed session which was the only "previous meeting" the 
attorney attended with the Commission on the subject at issue. 
The City's intent, as determined by the Appellant, as it tried to 'protect' the 
information provided to the Commission in the subject closed session is detailed above, 
so those same arguments are asserted here. 
The plain language provided by the State Legislature showed that it intended the 
actions of political subdivisions of the State to be taken openly and that their deliberations 
were also to be conducted openly. Utah Code Ann.§52-4-1. Our Constitution is 
predicated on the participation of an informed citizenry. 
Common Cause vs Utah Public Service Commission, 598 p.2d 1312 (Utah 1979) 
and Dairy Product Services vs the City of Wellsville, 2000 Ut 81; 13 P. 3d 581; 405 Utah 
Adv. Rep.23 (Utah 2000) are rulings which show it was the clear intent of the Legislature 
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that "any official meeting" wherein it performs the "information obtaining" phase of its 
activities, should not be held in private or in secret, but should be open to the public. 
Those rulings are particularly germane to this case as they preclude the possibility 
of sprinkling some discussion about litigation or inclusion of a few legal terms in any 
meeting as a means to camouflage "information obtaining" which a political entity may 
want to "protect" from public disclosure. The appellee has a history of frequently 
conducting suspiciously closed meetings. It also employed other forms of record 
suppression as it tried, sometimes unsuccessfully, to "protect" proposals for the right 
price, to barter its political powers and the resources of it citizens "for a more than fair" 
exchange" of value from the developer. Exhibits 2 & 3 , p. 17-27 of the record. 
With unclean hands as reflected above and a well-documented array of tempting 
offers of 'free' goods and services from the developer, it follows that the Appellee would 
violate open meeting laws, the integrity of its political processes and the best interests of 
residents by pressing for approval of this developer's controversial subdivision in secret 
when the same actions could not withstand public scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
In accord with Utah Code Ann.§ 52-4-10 (1)(2) and the above arguments and 
evidence, the Appellant respectfully asks the Court to review the minutes of the closed 
22 Jan 2004 Planning Commission meeting in camera then order their release for public 
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review, and to order additional sanctions against the Appellee as the Court deems 
appropriate in view of the damaged political processes and resulting injury to residents 
caused by the violations at issue. Appellant further asks the Court to award him court 
costs and related expenses plus any further forms of relief the Court decides are 
warranted. 
Brent Poll Date 
ProSe 
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Administrative Law > Agency Adjudication > Hearings 
Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standards of 
Review > Abuse of Discretion 
[HN3] The grant or denialvf a commutation hearing is a 
matter committed to the sound discretion of the Utah 
Board of Pardons, so long as that discretion is exercised 
consistent with the rules of the board, the statutes of Utah 
state, and the Utah and federal constitutions Utah Const 
art. VII, § 12. 
COUNSEL: 
R. Paul Van Dam, Salt Lake City, for the State of 
Utah. 
Robert R. Wallace, Daniel S, McConkie, Salt Lake City, 
for the State of Utah, Blanchard, Haun; titers, Sibbett, 
Carver, and Keller* Lorenzo Miller, Salt Lake City, for 
the Bd. of Pardons. 
Timothy K. Ford, Seattle^ taorcloii G. Greiner, Donald A. 
Degnan, Denver, Julius Chambers, Stdve Hawkins, New 
York, Robert M Anderson, Salt Lake CityJVorAndrews. 
JUDGES: Durham, Stewart 
OPINIONBY: PER CURIAM 
OPINION: 
[*792] PER CURIAM:
 r 
William Andrews ha$.filed an Application seeking a 
writ of habeas cor^MSffiiS^an extraordinary writ, 
contending that the Board|of Pardon$;failed to comply 
with the Open and Public Meetings Acl and violated his 
constitutional rights in denying his request for a 
commutation hearing and in declining to hold hearings 
on the matter. Andrews filed this petition with this court 
on July 23, 1992. The following day was a legal holiday 
in Utah. As of the time of this order, the [**2] Board of 
Pardons has not responded to the petition Just as this 
opinion was being finalized, an amicus brief was filed by 
the State, together with a motion for leave to file. We 
grant the motion and have^considered the State's brief. 
We treat the petition only as a request for an 
extraordinary writ. See Utah & App. P. 19. We rule as 
follows: 
% We begin with Andrews' argument that the Board of 
Pardons foiled to comply with the Utah Open and Public 
Meetings Act because it spent more than six weeks 
reviewing Andrews1 petition for a commutation hearing 
without ever holding an open, public hearing on its fact-
finding and decision-making processes. Because of this 
failure, Andrews contends, this court should void the 
Board's denial of a commutation hearing We agree in 
part. 
We agree with Andrews that [HN1] the Utah OpenN 
and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. § § 52-4-1 to 
-9, applies to the proceedings of the Board of Pardons 
because the Board is a "public body" within the meaning 
of the Act^See id. § 52-4-2(2). The State argues that 
the process by which the Board arrived at the decision 
not to grant a commutation hearing was not a "meeting" 
within the meaning of the Act [**3] and, therefore, the 
Act has no application here. We reject the State's 
argument. The plain language of the definitional section 
of the Act provides that meetings of the sort conducted 
by the Board are covered by the Act's provisions. [HN2] 
Section 52-4-2 provides that a "meeting" is 
the convening of a public body, with a_ 
"Convening" . . > lf!S8!IS!raPOTing of,a 
fleeting of a public body by. a person ^r persons 
-authorized to do so for the express purpose of discussing 
or acting upon a subject over which that public body has 
jurisdiction. 
Clearly, the meetings of the Board by which it arrived at 
die decision not to grant a hearing, which, in turn, is a 
necessary constitutional prerequisite to the grant of 
commutation, constitutes a "meeting" for the purposes of 
the Act The business done there was nothing if not the 
"discussion or acting upon a matter over which the 
[Board] has jurisdiction.* 
Having found that the Act applies, we cannot 
determine from the Board's order of July 21, 1992, 
whether the Board has violated die requirements of [**4] 
the Act. According to that order, the Board proceedings 
to date consisted not of information gathering, but of 
deliberations over the petition for a new commutation 
hearing, deliberations that included a review of the Ml 
public commutation hearing held in 1989. If this is the 
case, these proceedings would [*793] be of a judicial 
nature and exempt from the provisions of the statute. 
See Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Serv, 
Comm% 598 R2d 1312,1315 (Utah 1979) 
However, the Board's order is less than clear as to 
the information that was considered in reaching the 
decision to deny a hearing. Petitioner has filed an 
Page 4 
598 P.2d 1312, *; 1979 Utah LEXIS 876, **; 
5 Media L. Rep. 1780 
nlO U.C.A. 1953, 54-7-15. 
nil U.C.A. 1953,54-7-16. 
nl2 See e.g. Wycoffv. Pub. Serv. Comm., 13 
Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d 283. 
nl3 See School Dist. No. 9 v. District 
Boundary Board, Wyo., 351 P.2d 106; Stillwater 
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Oklahoma Savings & 
Loan Bd, Okla, 534 P.2d 9; Arizona Press Club, 
Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Appeals, 113 Ariz. 545, 
558 P.2d 697; Jordan v. Dist. of Columbia, D.C. 
App.,362A.2dll4. 
[**8] 
[*13l5] We are appreciative of the merit of the 
defendant's argument that it is highly desirable, or 
perhaps even essential, that those who are required to 
perform judicial duties should be permitted to do so in a 
judicial manner; and we agree with the proposition that 
where judicial duties and powers are conferred, there is 
necessarily implied therein the prerogative of carrying 
out those duties in the way the judiciary traditionally 
functions. It is quite unnatural to expect that a 
commissioner will not be thinking, i.e. "deliberating," 
upon such matters in private. This may be while riding 
home, or sitting in his favorite chair, or shaving, or 
whatever. His mind is with him and presumably will be 
mulling over such problems. But as will be seen from 
what is said herein, we see no reason why that cannot be 
done without any direct conflict with the "Sunshine Law" 
statutes, if they are given a practical application. 
Notwithstanding what has just been said about 
judicial aspects of the functions of the Commission, and 
the desirability of its having the prerogative of 
performing those functions in the traditional judicial 
manner, there are certain fundamental propositions 
relating [**9] to the cited statutes to be confronted and 
dealt with. The first is that the Commission itself is a 
creation of legislative enactment and derives both its 
authority and its duties therefrom. nl4 It would seem in 
harmony therewith that it should follow the mandates of 
the legislature as to the manner in which it operates; and 
should therefore comply with the spirit and purpose of 
the Sunshine Act, insofar as it is practicable to do so. To 
that end, if the expressions of the statute appear to place 
restrictions on the means essential to the carrying out of 
the Commission's responsibilities, the effort should be 
made to give the statute a practical application in such 
manner as to avoid or reconcile any such apparent 
inconsistency or conflict, so that the Commission may 
function properly and effectively. 
nl4 See U.C.A. 1953, 54-4-1 et seq.; Utah 
Copper Co. v. Pub. Util Comm., 59 Utah 191, 
203 P. 627 (1921). 
In regard to the problem under consideration herein, 
a distinction should be made between the Commission's 
[**10] activities when it is convened as a public body 
for the purpose of conducting hearings, taking evidence, 
or hearing arguments, discussions or suggestions, which 
we may refer to as the "information obtaining" phase of 
its activities, as distinguished from its analyzing and 
contemplative processes, which we refer to as the 
"decision making" phase of the Commission's activities. 
From a reading of the above quoted statutes (the 
Sunshine Law), it is clear that the legislature intended 
that any official meeting of the Commission, wherein it 
performs the "information obtaining" phase of its 
activities, should not be held in private or in secret, but 
should be open to the public. However, once the 
"information obtaining" procedure has been completed, it 
is essential that during the "decision making" or judicial 
phase, those charged with that duty have the opportunity 
of discussing and thinking about the matter in private, 
free from any clamor or pressure, so they can calmly 
analyze and deliberate upon questions of fact, upon the 
applicable law, and upon considerations of policy, which 
bear upon the problems with which they are confronted. 
It is undoubtedly in recognition of the desirability 
[**11] and practicality of such procedure that the Act 
includes Section 52-4-4 which provides that a closed 
meeting may be held if two-thirds of the members (two 
of the three commissioners) vote to do so. Whether the 
"decision making" phase is accomplished in such private 
meeting, or in private deliberations, it is to be observed 
that that statute further provides that at such a closed 
meeting, "no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, 
contract, or appointment shall be approved." In 
conformity with that statute, any final and formal action 
of the Commission on such matters should be announced 
or issued in a meeting open to the public. 
[*1316] Upon the basis of what has been said 
herein, ft is our conclusion that the "Open and Public 
Meetings Act" requires the Commission to conduct the 
"information obtaining" phase of its activities in 
proceedings open to the public. However, we cannot see 
anything in a practical application of the statutes which 
would prevent the commissioners from discharging the 
"decision-making," and thus the judicial aspects of their 
duties, in the traditional judicial manner of private 
analysis, contemplation, and discussion among the 
commissioners, so long [**12] as the intent and purpose 
of the Act is preserved in harmony with the principles 
and pattern stated in this decision. Therefore, insofar as 
\¥" 
iXooo u ^ ^ l ; \S ?,l<=k ^ ^ ' z ^ ° ^ ' ^ v W k IXAv. #ef• 3 1 C ^ O O O L A J ^ ) 
D. Open Meetings 
^f59 DPSI also argues that due process requires that the council deliberate in 
public. "AH meetings of the governing body of each municipality shall be held in 
compliance with the provisions of Title 52, Chapter 4 [Utah Open and Public 
Meetings Act], relating to open and public meetings." Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-
fin 1 [1 QQQ^ f^ J T n e Open and Public Meetings Act (the "Act") provides that "[e]very meeting is open to the public unless closed 
pursuant to^c l ions 52-4-4 and 52-4-5." Id. §§ 52-4-3 (1998). Section 52-4-4 provides that a closed meeting may be held upon an 
affirmative two-thirds vote of a quorum of the public body but that no closed meeting may be held "except as to matters exempted under 
Section 52-4-5; provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or appointment shall be approved at a closed meeting." 
Among the matters exempted under section 52-4-5 is any "strategy sessions to discuss pending or reasonably imminent litigation." 
ffiI60 That being said, however, we have previously analyzed the Act as it relates to public bodies performing judicial duties and have 
held: 
[l]t is clear that the legislature intended that any official meeting of the [public body], wherein it performs the "information 
obtaining" phase of its activities, should not be held in private or in secret, but should be open to the public. However, once 
the "information obtaining" procedure has been completed, it is essential that during the "decision making" or judicial phase, 
those charged with that duty have the opportunity of discussing and thinking about the matter in private, free from any clamor 
or pressure, so they can calmly analyze and deliberate upon questions of fact, upon the applicable law, and upon 
considerations of policy, which bear upon the problems with which they are confronted. 
Common Cause of Utah v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 598 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Utah 1979); see also Andrews v. Board of Pardons, 836 P.2d 
790, 792-93 (Utah 1992) (per curiam) (finding judicial nature of board deliberations to be exempt from requirements of Utah Open and 
Public Meetings Act). Therefore, as long as the "information obtaining" procedures are conducted in the open and any final or formal 
action is announced or issued in the open, the "decision making" or deliberation of a public body during a judicial process may be held 
in private and is exempt from the requirements of the Act. See Common Cause of Utah, 598 P.2d at 1315. 
H1J61 Wellsville conducted the October 9,1996, meeting in public and adjourned only for deliberation. After twenty-five minutes of 
deliberation, the council returned to the public forum and announced its decision and final order in public. Therefore, we hold that the 
district court did not err in concluding that the Wellsville City Council did not violate DPSI's due process rights when the council 
deliberated in private. 
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leading to, and the possible results of, Riverton City's annexation petition. Next, counsel 
informed the County Commission that South Jordan City had already protested Riverton 
City's petition and offered three possible courses of action for the County Commission to take 
with respect to the petit ion: (1) send a letter to Riverton City listing technical problems with 
the petit ion, but refrain from appearing before the Boundary Commission; (2) appear, 
through counsel, before the Boundary Commission and address only technical problems with 
the petit ion; or (3) file a formal protest opposing the annexation. Moreover, counsel also 
suggested that one [ * * 6 9 1 ] option regarding the protest of technicalities not be pursued; 
and at the end of the private session, the County Commission selected a course of action, 
agreeing to appear before the Boundary [ * * * 1 5 ] Commission and to send a letter to 
Riverton City identifying technical problems. This closed session during which the County 
Commission was informed of the background of the Riverton City annexation petit ion, was 
advised on how to respond to the petit ion, was given a recommended course of action, ar \ j | 
decided on a course of action, constitutes a strategy session. 
B. Whether Disputes Before the Boundary Commission Constitute Litigation 
[ * P 1 9 ] Having concluded the closed portion of the meeting was a strategy session,(the 
question becomes whether the meeting was a discussion p f lit igation strategy, or whether it 
was strategy with respect to a non-lit igation process. Essentially, we must decide whether an 
annexation matter before the Boundary Commission is l it igation. 
[ * P 2 0 ] The County Commission reasons that county boundary commission proceedings are 
pending or reasonably imminent litigation because annexation proceedings before a boundary 
commission include adverse parties, representation, notice, witnesses, evidence, exhibits, 
transcripts, appeals to the district court, etc., and are therefore quasi-judicial proceedings 
that qualify as lit igation. Kearns-Tribune, [ * * * 1 6 ] on the other hand, argues that boundary 
commission proceedings are legislative proceedings, not l it igation. The amici also assert that 
annexation proceedings are not l it igation. They say that the plain meaning of the term 
"litigation" implies court proceedings, and defining "l i t igation" to include agency proceedings 
would result in the litigation exception swallowing the general rule of openness intended by 
the Open and Public Meetings Act. Furthermore, the amici cite Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 
Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (Utah 1972) r and Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 
(Utah 1975), for the proposition that annexation proceedings are legislative functions and are 
therefore not lit igation. They argue that even though boundary commission proceedings may 
be similar to litigation procedurally, the substance of boundary commission decisions is a 
matter of public policy that should be debated publicly. 
[ * P 2 1 ] This court has clearly indicated that the determination of municipal boundaries is a 
legislative function, see Sweetwater Props, v. Town of Alta, 622 P.2d 1178, 1180 fUtah 
1981); Freeman v. Centerville City, 600 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Utah 1979): T * * * l 7 ] Child, 538 
P.2d at 186: Bradshaw, 27 Utah 2d at 137 f 493 P.2d at 645, and we do not depart from this 
conclusion. More accurately, the determination of municipal boundaries is a function of the 
state legislature, as opposed to a local legislative body. This is because H / v i a ? loca l 
governmental bodies, as political subdivisions of the state, have no inherent control over 
their own boundaries as they derive their powers from the State. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. 
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607-08, 115 L Ed. 2d 532 r 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991) 
(stating that it is well settled that local governmental units are created as agencies for 
exercising the State's governmental powers and that the governmental powers that may be 
entrusted to local governments are granted in the absolute discretion of the State); see also 
1 Antieau on Local Government Law § 3.01 (2d ed. 2000). Accordingly, we maintain that 
" ^ • ^ t h e determination of municipal boundaries, including land annexation, is a legislative 
function within the control of the state legislature. 
[ * P 2 2 ] Our legislature has delegated, to a certain extent, this authority over 
annexation [ * * * 1 8 ] and has enacted a statutory system that controls the annexation 
.../retrieve?_m-08fe2a30d59658fc02cl26240eab8a8c&docnum=4& fmtstr=FULL& startdoc 9/20/2004 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
10-1-6: INTERPRETATION: 
In interpreting and applying the interpretations of this Title, the requirements contained 
herein are declared to be the minimum requirements for the purposes set forth, unless 
otherwise specifically stated. If, in the course of administration hereof, a question arises 
as to the meaning of any phrase, section or chapter, the interpretation thereof given by the 
Planning Commission shall be construed to be the official interpretation thereof In the 
event that there is a need of further interpretation by any person, firm or corporation or 
official of the City, they shall submit the question to the Board of Adjustment, which is 
authorized to interpret the Title as provided herein. Where the question is still unsatisfied, 
the applicant may either apply for an amendment to this Title to clarify the portion thereof 
which is in question or may file a petition with a court of competent jurisdiction for final 
interpretation. (1989 Code § 12-1-006) 
CHAPTER 3 
PLANNING COMMISSION 
10-3-2: SCOPE: 
All matters pertaining to: a) the physical development of the City, except as concerned 
with the Uniform Building Code; b) the use and zoning of land for private or public 
purposes; c) the location, widening, narrowing, abandonment, extensions or relocation of 
proposed or existing streets, also the acquisitions of land for new streets, or the 
acceptance of private streets for public use, and the sale of or lease of City-owned streets; 
d) the acquisition or acceptance of land for any public property, public way, ground, place 
or structure, also the sale or lease of City-owned property, and the location of public 
buildings, parks or open spaces; e) the location and extent of public or private utilities; 
and f) the subdivision of land, shall be submitted to the Planning Commission for 
consideration and recommendation before action is taken thereon by the City Council or 
other City official. (Ord. 96-2, 10-22-1996, eff. 12-1-1996; amd. 1998 Code) 
10-3-5: POWERS AND DUTIES: 
A. Entrance Upon Land: The Planning Commission, its members and employees, in the 
performance of its functions, may enter upon any land at reasonable times to make 
examinations and surveys, and place and maintain necessary monuments and marks 
thereon. In general, the Planning Commission shall have such powers as may be 
necessary to enable it to perform its functions and promote Municipal planning. 
B. Administrative Duties: The Planning Commission shall: 
1. Prepare and recommend a General Plan and amendments to the General Plan to 
the City Council as provided under State law; 
2. Recommend zoning ordinances and maps, and amendments to zoning ordinances 
and maps, to the City Council as provided under State law; 
3. Administer provisions of this Zoning Title as specifically provided in this Zoning 
Title; 
4. Recommend subdivision regulations and amendments to those regulations to the 
City Council as provided under State law; 
5. Recommend approval or denial of subdivision applications as provided under 
State law; 
6. Advise the City Council on matters as directed by the City Council; 
7. Hear and decide conditional use permits; 
8. Exercise any other powers necessary to enable it to perform its function. 
C. Public Hearings; Reports And Recommendations: The Planning Commission may 
hold public hearings and shall do so as required by law. It may make reports and 
recommendations relating to the plan and development of the City to public officials 
and agencies, other organizations and citizens, It may recommend to the executive or 
legislative officials programs for public improvements and the financing thereof. 
(Ord. 96-2,10-22-19%, cff. 12-1-1996) 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
11-1-1: PURPOSE AND SCOPE: 
A. Purpose And Intent: The purpose and intent of this Title is to promote the public 
health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of the incorporated 
territory of the City in the matter of subdivisions or matters affected by subdivisions 
through provisions designed to: 
4. Avoid scattered and premature subdivisions which would cause insufficient public 
services and facilities, or necessitate an excessive expenditure of public funds for 
the supply of such services and facilities. 
Addendum C 
Addendum C 
52-4-1. Declaration of public policy. 
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the state, its agencies and 
political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the peopled business. It is the intent 
of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted 
openly. 
Amended by Chapter 180, 1977 General Session 
52-4-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Convening" means the calling of a meeting of a public body by a person authorized 
to do so for the express purpose of discussing or acting upon a subject over which that 
public body has jurisdiction. 
(2) (a) "Meeting" means the convening of a public body, with a quorum present, whether 
in person or by means of electronic equipment, for the purpose of discussing or acting 
upon a matter over which the public body has jurisdiction or advisory power. 
(b) "Meeting" does not mean: 
(i) a chance meeting; or 
(ii) the convening of a public body that has both legislative and executive responsibilities 
where no public funds are appropriated for expenditure during the time the public body is 
convened and: 
(A) the public body is convened solely for the discussion or implementation of 
administrative or operational matters for which no formal action by the public body is 
required; or 
(B) the public body is convened solely for the discussion or implementation of 
administrative or operational matters that would not come before the public body for 
discussion or action. 
(3) (a) "Public body" means any administrative, advisory, executive, or legislative body of 
the state or its political subdivisions that: 
(i) consists of two or more persons; 
(ii) expends, disburses, or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue; and 
(iii) is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding the public's business. 
(b) "Public body" does not include any: 
(i) political party, group, or caucus; nor 
(ii) any conference committee, rules committee, or sifting committee of the Legislature. 
(4) (a) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the membership of a public body, unless 
otherwise defined by applicable law. 
(b) "Quorum" does not include a meeting of two elected officials by themselves when no 
action, either formal or informal, is taken on a subject over which these elected officials 
have jurisdiction. 
Amended by Chapter 89, 1994 General Session 
52-4-4. Closed meeting held upon vote of members — Business — Reasons for 
meeting recorded. 
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of 
the public body present at an open meeting for which notice is given pursuant to Section 
52-4-6; provided, a quorum is present. No closed meeting is allowed except as to matters 
exempted under Section 52-4-5; provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, 
contract, or appointment shall be approved at a closed meeting. The reason or reasons for 
holding a closed meeting and the vote, either for or against the proposition to hold such a 
meeting, cast by each member by name shall be entered on the minutes of the meeting. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any meeting to be closed to the 
public. 
Enacted by Chapter 180, 1977 General Session 
52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings — Chance meetings and social meetings excluded 
— Disruption of meetings. 
(1) (a) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Section 52-4-4 for any of the following 
purposes: 
(i) discussion of the character, professional competence, or physical or mental health of 
an individual; 
(ii) strategy sessions to discuss collective bargaining; 
(iii) strategy sessions to discuss pending or reasonably imminent litigation; 
(iv) strategy sessions to discuss the purchase, exchange, or lease of real property when 
public discussion of the transaction would disclose the appraisal or estimated value of the 
property under consideration or prevent the public body from completing the transaction 
on the best possible terms; 
(v) strategy sessions to discuss the sale of real property when: 
(A) public discussion of the transaction would disclose the appraisal or estimated value of 
the property under consideration or prevent the public body from completing the 
transaction on the best possible terms; 
(B) the public body had previously given public notice that the property would be offered 
for sale; and 
(C) the terms of the sale are publicly disclosed before the public body approves the sale; 
(vi) discussion regarding deployment of security personnel, devices, or systems; 
(vii) investigative proceedings regarding allegations of criminal misconduct; and 
(viii) discussion by a county legislative body of commercial information as defined in 
Section 59-1-404. 
(b) A public body may not interview a person applying to fill an elected position in a 
closed meeting. 
(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to require any public body to approve the 
purchase, sale, exchange, or lease of real property if that puolic body is not required to 
approve the purchase, sale, exchange, or lease of real property under other laws. 
(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance meeting or a social meeting. No chance 
meeting or social meeting shall be used to circumvent this chapter. 
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of any person who willfully disrupts a 
meeting to the extent that orderly conduct is seriously compromised. 
Amended by Chapter 294, 2004 General Session 
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings. 
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings that are scheduled in advance over the 
course of a year shall give public notice at least once each vear of its annual meeting 
schedule as provided in this section. The public notice shall specify the date, time, and 
place of such meetings. 
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Subsection (1) of this section, each public 
body shall give not less than 24 hours1 public notice of the agenda, date, time and place of 
each of its meetings. 
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by: 
(a) posting written notice at the principal office of the public body, or if no such office 
exists, at the building where the meeting is to be held; and 
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of general circulation within the geographic 
jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media correspondent. 
(4) Public bodies are encouraged to develop and use electronic means to post notice in 
addition to those means listed in Subsection (3). 
(5) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is necessary for a public body to hold an 
emergency meeting to consider matters of an emergency or urgent nature, the notice 
requirements of Subsection (2) may be disregarded^and the best notice practicable given. 
No such emergency meeting of a public body shall be held unless an attempt has been 
made to notify all of its members and a majority votes in the affirmative to hold the 
meeting. 
Amended by Chapter 110,1998 General Session 
52-4-10. Action challenging closed meeting. 
(1) Notwithstanding the procedure established in Subsection 63-2-202(7), in any action 
brought under the authority of this chapter to challenge the legality of a closed meeting 
held by a public body, the court shall: 
(a) review the tape recording or written minutes of the closed meeting in camera; and 
(b) decide the legality of the closed meeting. 
(2) (a) If the judge determines that the public body did not violate the law governing 
closed meetings, the judge shall dismiss the case without disclosing or revealing any 
information from the tape recording or minutes of the closed meeting. 
(b) If the judge determines that the oublic body violated the law governing closed 
meetings, the judge shall publicly disclose or reveal from the tape recordings or minutes 
of the closed meeting all information about the portion of the meeting that was illegally 
closed. 
Enacted by Chapter 89,1994 General Session 
Addendum D 
Addendum D 
SOUTH WEBER CITY PLANNING COMMISSION AGENDA 
nJBLIC NOTICE is hereby given that the Planning Commission of SOUTH WEBER CITY, Davis 
County, Utah will meet in a REGULAR public meeting on JANUARY 22,2004, at the South Weber 
City Council Chambers, 1600 East South Weber Drive, commencing at 6:30 p.m. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
A MEETING WILL BE HELD PRIOR TO THE REGULAR PLANNING COMMISSION MEETING 
BEGINNING AT 6:00 P.M. FOR WORK/DISCUSSION PURPOSES 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING IS AS FOLLOWS: 
APPROVAL OF AGENDA: 
APPROVAL OF MINUTES: Commissioner Graydon DATE OF MINUTES: December 11,2003 
6:33 P.M. Change of Zoning Request. Parcels #09-005-0003, (20.6 acres), and #09-005-0028, (20 acres), 
approximately 2300 East and 8300 South, South Weber, from A (Agricultural) Denisty Zone to 
the R-M (Residential-Moderate) Density Zone. Bruce L. Nilson, agent. 
6:50 P.M. Final Plat Review, Byram Park Estates, Parcel #13-029-0040, approximately 7400 South 1550 
East, 68 lots. U.S. Development, agent. 
7:15 P.M. City Sign Ordinance Amendments, Barry Burton. 
OTHER BUSINESS: 
COMMITTEE ITEMS: 
FOLLOW-UP ITEMS FROM PREVIOUS MEETING: 
NON-SCHEDULED DELEGATION: 
ADJOURNMENT TIME: 
********************************************************************************* 
THE UNDERSIGNED CLERK/PLANNING COMMISSION SECRETARY FOR THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOUTH WEBER CITY HEREBY 
CERTIFIES THAT A COPY OF THE FOREGOING NOTICE WAS MAILED OR POSTED TO. 
RAYs VALLEY SERVICE STANDARD-EXAMINER CITY OFFICE BUILDING CLIPPER TODAY 
TOWN OF UINTAH RTVERDALE CITY OFFICE 
LAYTON CITY OFFICE THOSE LISTED ON THE AGENDA 
TO EACH MEMBER OF THE GOVERNING BODY SOUTH WEBER ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 
DATE : January 15,2004 DEBBIE W. COWDIN, G L E R K ^ ^ f f 1 _ jjpOT 0 I A ) ( iTU ijLsv^J 
IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, INDIVIDUALS NEEDING SPECIAL ACCOMMODATIONS DURING 
THIS MEETING SHOULD NOTIFY DEBBIE COWDIN, 1600 EAST SOUTH WEBER DRIVE, SOUTH WEBER, UTAH 84405 (479-3177)AT 
.EAST TWO DAYS PRIOR TO THE MEETING. 
****************************************************************************************** 
* Agenda times are flexible and may be moved in order, sequence and time to meet the needs of the Commission* 
SOUTH WEBER CITY PLANNING COMMISSION 
AMENDED AGENDA 
PUBLIC NOTICE is hereby given that the Planning Commission of SOUTH WEBER CITY, Davis 
County, Utah will meet in a REGULAR public meeting on JANUARY 22, 2004, at the South Weber 
City Council Chambers, 1600 East South Weber Drive, commencing at 6:30 p.m. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Planning Commission will hold a public work session beginning at 6:00 p.m. 
6:03 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. Closed Executive Session in accordance to UCA 52-4-5(l)(A)(iii), for the 
purpose of pending litagation. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING IS AS FOLLOWS; 
APPROVAL OF AGENDA: 
APPROVAL OF MINUTES: Commissioner Graydon DATE OF MINUTES: December 11, 2003 
6:33 P.M. Change of Zoning Request. Parcels #09-005-0003, (20.6 acres), and #09-005-0028, (20 acres), 
approximately 2300 East and 8300 South, South Weber, from A (Agricultural) Denisty Zone to 
the R-M (Residential-Moderate) Density Zone. Bruce L. Nilson, agent. 
6:50 P.M. Final Plat Review, Byram Park Estates, Parcel #13-029-0040, approximately 7400 South 1550 
East, 68 lots. U.S. Development, agent. 
7:15 P.M. City Sign Ordinance Amendments, Barry Burton. 
OTHER BUSINESS: 
COMMITTEE ITEMS: 
FOLLOW-UP ITEMS FROM PREVIOUS MEETING: 
NON-SCHEDULED DELEGATION: 
ADJOURNMENT TIME: 
****************************************************************************************** 
THE UNDERSIGNED CLERK/PLANNING COMMISSION SECRETARY FOR THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOUTH WEBER CITY HEREBY 
CERTIFIES THAT A COPY OF THE FOREGOING NOTICE WAS MAILED OR POSTED TO: 
RAY's VALLEY SERVICE STANDARD-EXAMINER CITY OFFICE BUILDING 
CLIPPER TODAY SOUTH WEBER ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 
>CLE^^iMio UJ ( crurA* DATE : January 20, 2004 DEBBIE W. COWDIN 
IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, INDIVIDUALS NEEDING SPECIAL ACCOMMODATIONS DURING 
THIS MEETING SHOULD NOTIFY DEBBIE COWDIN, 1600 EAST SOUTH WEBER DRIVE, SOUTH WEBER, UTAH 84405 (479-3177) AT 
^AST TWO DAYS PRIOR TO THE MEETING. 
******************************************** 
*Agenda times are flexible and may be moved in order, sequence and time to meet the needs of the Commission* 
